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Abstract—Effectively protecting the Windows OS is a challenging task, since most implementation details are
not publicly known. Windows has always been the main target of malwares that have exploited numerous bugs
and vulnerabilities. Recent trusted boot and additional integrity checks have rendered the Windows OS less
vulnerable to kernel-level rootkits. Nevertheless, guest Windows Virtual Machines are becoming an increasingly
interesting attack target. In this work we introduce and analyze a novel Hypervisor-Based Introspection System
(HyBIS) we developed for protecting Windows OSes from malware and rootkits. The HyBIS architecture is
motivated and detailed, while targeted experimental results show its effectiveness. Comparison with related work
highlights main HyBIS advantages such as: effective semantic introspection, support for 64-bit architectures
and for latest Windows (8.x and 10), advanced malware disabling capabilities. We believe the research effort
reported here will pave the way to further advances in the security of Windows OSes.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Securing the Windows OS is a very challenging
task, given its complexity and also given that
its internals are not publicly known. Over time,
a large set of malwares have targeted vulner-
abilities in Windows OSes and services. Due
to the very large installed base of Windows
OSes, there is a great amount of new malware
produced every year, which implements ad-
vanced methods for detection avoidance. The
problem is particularly interesting for recent
Windows versions, which have not yet been
fully analyzed/investigated by the research
community.
Among the different kinds of malware, rootk-
its represent the most complex and dangerous
threats. In fact, rootkits can alter the system’s
perception of itself, and conceal malicious
activities over a large period of time (i.e. APTs
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[1]). In particular, modern rootkits can directly
manipulate memory structures to further en-
hance their stealthiness. As such, security tools
can hardly detect them and are usually unable
react to the infection. For this reason, rootkit
detection is a vital task for protecting Windows
and it is then fundamental to make it as
effective as possible.
1.1 Motivation
Current monitoring approaches cannot provide
an adequate level of protection against rootkits
targeting Windows OSes. In fact, most present
solutions operate at the same level as rootkits
do[2], [3]. By tampering with the functions
leveraged by security tools, rootkits are able to
evade detection from within the OS. Hence,
anti-rootkit tools working at the OS level
cannot be trusted in case of rootkit infection.
When the OS is running in a virtual machine,
however, this problem can be addressed in a
different way. Such a scenario, in fact, allows
an external observation of the OS, from a more
trustworthy and isolated environment. This
capability is provided by the hypervisor, which
can directly access VM components without
leveraging OS functions.
Such a capability enables the adoption of
virtual machine introspection (VMI) [4], [5],
2which consists of inferring the guest OS se-
mantics from the analysis of the status of VM
components. VMI provides a valuable tool to
counter rootkits since they can hardly conceal
their presence to an monitoring system not
dependent on OS functions.
On the one hand, VMI on Windows guest is
however hard in practice as it requires some
specific OS information to in order to make
sense out of raw machine data[5]. This is one
of the challenges of our present work, and
it is also one of the main contribution of
this work. On the other hand, VMI can be
supported by the use of the forensic memory
analysis (FMA), which provides the means for
extracting OS information from raw memory
data. In fact, as stated above, modern rootkits
manipulate memory to avoid detection and
can thus be identified by inspecting the same
memory contents[6]. This is a clear advantage
over rootkits and allows the implementation
of more reliable security systems.
Moreover, once the infection has been iden-
tified, the hypervisor also allows an effective
reaction. In fact, by leveraging unfettered full
access to physical resources, a security tool can
directly manipulate the VM and stop rootkit
activities.
All these features, render the hypervisor
a very attractive place where to implement
security functionalities. In this work, we will
leverage advanced VMI and FMA to help
securing Windows OSes in virtualized envi-
ronments.
1.2 Contribution
This work introduces and discusses a novel
effective approach for countering rootkits on
a Windows OS running in a VM. The im-
plemented security monitor is external to
the target machine, similarly to some recent
literature[7], [8], [9]. By leveraging VMI and
current FMA tools, we developed a novel
Hypervisor-Based Introspection System (HyBIS)
for protecting a Windows OS from stealth
malware, in particular from rootkits.
The proposed system extends the hypervisor
to monitor the state of the running machine,
to detect rootkits, and to react to the discov-
ered anomalies. The monitoring functionality
leverages VMI techniques to infer the guest
OS status. In order to detect rootkits, guest
memory is scanned for kernel objects which
may have been hidden. Such a scan is per-
formed on memory dump files by means of
FMA techniques and tools. Although such
tools are typically used for offline analyses,
the proposed system utilises them in a live
way, during the system execution. To this pur-
pose, HyBIS provides a novel dumping system
which allows improving the performance of
the memory acquisition task. Furthermore, a
novel reaction approach is implemented that
makes use of the hypervisor to manipulate
memory contents while the virtual machine is
running. This capability is leveraged to prevent
the execution of detected rootkit processes.
HyBIS allows detecting and reacting to rootkits
effectively on Windows 8.1 and Windows 10
OSes. HyBIS successfully proves that the com-
bination of VMI and FMA provides a valuable
tool for countering rootkits on Windows OSes.
2 HYBIS: AN HYPERVISOR-BASED
INTROSPECTION SYSTEM FOR WIN-
DOWS
This section describes HyBIS, our solution
combining FMA techniques with the VMI
approach.
As mentioned above, the main goal of our
work is to improve Windows security in virtu-
alized environments. In particular, our research
focuses on protecting such OS from rootkits.
In order to protect Windows from modern
rootkits, we mostly focused our studies on
the RAM component. Memory, in fact, stores
both code and data and is involved in almost
every operation performed on the machine
during the OS execution. Thus, RAM can
be considered the most complete source of
information about the status of a running OS
at a specific time.
For such a reason, Modern rootkits use to
manipulate memory to conceal their activities
and resources. Nonetheless they reside in RAM
while running, thus giving the opportunity
to detect their presence. Hence, memory is
the best place where to look for inferring the
current status of the target machine. FMA
enables performing such a task in an effective
and convenient way.
2.1 Our Approach
The basic idea we followed for the develop-
ment of our security system was that the hy-
pervisor can do more than what it is intended
3for. The chosen design approach was then to
augment the hypervisor capabilities by means
of introspection techniques. We extended the
hypervisor by introducing the following func-
tionalities:
• Monitoring: the hypervisor is enabled to to
monitor the machine state in order to real-
ize if something anomalous is happening;
• Analysis: the hypervisor is enabled to to
analyze the state of the guest OS in order
to detect the presence of rootkits;
• Reaction: the hypervisor is enabled to to
react when a rootkit is detected and block
its activities.
The above functionalities leverage internal
hypervisor functions as well as external li-
braries and tools. The internal functions pro-
vide direct access to virtual machine hardware
components. In particular, they allow mon-
itoring the VM CPU and physical memory.
By checking the CPU state and reading the
memory contents, it is possible to implement a
transparent monitoring function. Furthermore,
the write access to memory can give the ability
to perform changes into a running VM.
By making use of external tools and libraries,
the hypervisor can be given even more capa-
bilities. For instance, by integrating memory
forensic functions, it is possible to implement
advanced analysis techniques, which may al-
low detecting the presence of rootkits into the
system.
Monitoring: Checking The System State:
the virtual machine state can be analyzed by
means of VMI. As stated before, the hypervisor
has the ability to access virtual hardware
resources directly, allowing the monitoring of
all the VM components. In particular, we chose
to monitor CPU and memory as they are core
components of the machine.
The CPU state changes can be easily moni-
tored by using internal hypervisor functions.
Such functions allow, for instance, checking the
current operating mode, or inspecting registers.
VM memory contents changes can be
monitored by means of differential dumps.
With this approach, memory dumps are
periodically generated to check if a particular
area has been modified. In order to implement
such a functionality, an initial memory
snapshot must be taken at a specific time.
Such a snapshot can then be used as basis for
the comparison with the following checkpoints.
Analysis: Detecting Rootkits: as previously
explained, modern rootkits are able to manipu-
late memory objects at runtime to conceal their
activities. Hence, in order to detect rootkits, the
analysis functionality should focus on the mem-
ory contents. This kind of analysis requires
advanced forensic techniques to discover an
infection. A convenient approach would be
then to make use of functions from an external
forensic tool or library.
Memory forensic analyses are commonly
based on memory dumps. Hence, a memory
acquisition functionality is required to make
use of the forensic tools. Fortunately, most
hypervisors implement their own dumping
facility which can be used to acquire guest
memory. Such a facility can be easily expand-
ed/adapted to improve the acquisition process
and realize the above-mentioned differential
dumping functionality.
Reaction: Countering Rootkits: in order to
react when a rootkit is detected, some kind of
action must be taken to prevent it to perform
further activities. As in previous cases, the
guest memory can be used to implement the
reaction functionality.
Since rootkits, even if concealed, reside in
memory, it would be a good approach to
counter them into the same place. Once again,
hypervisor functions can be helpful: by writing
into guest memory it could be possible to delete
the detected rootkit from memory, or to block
its execution.
3 HYBIS FUNCTIONALITIES
We set up to implement four high-level func-
tionalities in HyBIS:
• Automatic boot dump generation;
• Smart differential dumping;
• Detection of hidden rootkit processes;
• Blocking of hidden rootkit processes;
Automatic Boot Dump Generation: as ex-
plained above, the monitoring functionality
should allow deciding when an analysis oper-
ation would be appropriate.
Since the analysis functionality operates over
memory dumps, we decided to automatically
generate a dump on the basis of some hardware
event. In particular, we chose to monitor the
VM during the boot phase in order to produce
a dump at the very beginning of the Windows
loading.
4This choice has a twofold reason. Firstly, it
aims at determining the first feasible moment
for analyzing a memory dump with a forensic
tool; in fact, these tools need the kernel to
be loaded in order to work. Secondly, such a
preliminary dump can be used as starting point
for a following monitoring of the memory; in
fact, after the kernel has loaded, most of the
system areas remain fixed during the rest of
OS execution.
Hence, this function should allow HyBIS
to automatically generate a memory dump as
soon as the Windows kernel process starts.
This objective has been chosen to
demonstrate how, by means of introspection,
the VM state monitoring can be effectively
used for determining meaningful moments of
the OS execution.
Smart Differential Dumping: besides the
CPU, the monitoring functionality can check
specific virtual machine memory areas for
changes, in order to decide if an analysis
operation is needed.
As stated above, a differential approach can
be taken to perform this kind of monitoring.
However, memory acquisition can be a very
onerous task to perform, especially when it has
to be repeated over time. So, it is important
to do such an operation efficiently in order to
not compromise the guest system performance.
Since only some memory ranges need to be
checked, there is no need to dump the whole
memory at every checkpoint. Instead, it should
be enough to acquire only the ranges we are
interested in.
This function should allow HyBIS to up-
date a previously created dump by acquiring
selective ranges and overwriting them into
the corresponding areas. Previous contents of
such ranges should be backed up in separate
files in order to allow the comparison between
different checkpoints. With such an approach, it
can be said that HyBIS uses “dynamic” dumps.
Dynamic dumps can also be used to improve
the acquisition process necessary for the foren-
sic analyses. In fact, since such analyses usually
involve only some ranges of the whole dump,
it is possible to use the update mechanisms
described above, to perform the analyses of
different checkpoints without needing to create
multiple dumps of the whole memory.
This objective has been chosen to demon-
strate how monitoring the VM memory can be
both effective and efficient.
Detection of hidden rootkit processes: it
is well-known that rootkits try to hide their
processes to avoid detection.
This is effectively obtained by implementing
the DKOM technique.In particular, a rootkit
who wants to hide a process could remove the
corresponding object from the active process
list. In fact, Windows uses two list of processes:
one for the scheduling, and one for tracking.
A process whose object is removed from the
tracking list, will be invisible while still active.
As such, hidden processes can be detected
by means of a cross-view analysis. More specif-
ically, this can be done by scanning memory
for process objects, and comparing results with
the active process list. If a scanned process is
not present in such a list it is likely to be a
hidden rootkit process. This function should
allow HyBIS to detect hidden processes by
creating a memory dump and scanning it for
concealed process objects.
This objective has been chosen to
demonstrate how FMA can help in detecting
rootkits on running guest OSes.
Blocking of hidden rootkit processes: once
a hidden process has been detected, it should
be blocked to prevent it from keeping perform-
ing malicious activities. This action will not
clean the infection but it could be a first step
to defeat the rootkit.
A good idea for blocking a hidden process
would be to exclude it from scheduling, thus
preventing its execution. This can be done
using the DKOM technique in a similar way
as that used by the rootkits. More specifically,
we can block an hidden process by removing
the corresponding object from the scheduling
list. This function should allow HyBIS to ma-
nipulate the VM memory in order to prevent
the rootkit process to be executed.
This objective has been chosen to demon-
strate how the hypervisor capabilities allow
an effective reaction to a rootkit infection by
means of memory manipulation.
4 DESIGN AND ARCHITECTURE
This section shows how HyBIS was designed to
extend the hypervisor capabilities for securing
a guest Windows OS from the rootkit threat.
First we show the overall HyBIS operation
from a high-level point of view. Next, we
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describe the HyBIS architecture. Finally, we
describe and motivate the technologies chosen
to build up the first HyBIS prototype, and the
most relevant implementation details.
The high-level overview of the HyBIS op-
erating mode is depicted in Figure 1. The
new functionalities are designed to work as
a closed loop control system. The monitoring
phase extracts information from a running
machine and intercepts events which could
reveal the presence of rootkits. The analysis
phase examines the system in order to evaluate
if a rootkit infection occurred. In such a case, it
triggers the reaction phase, otherwise it returns
to the monitoring phase. The reaction phase
tries to remove the infection or block the rootkit
for preventing further malicious activities.
The monitoring and reaction functionalities
leverage the introspection and control capabil-
ities of the hypervisor. The analysis function-
ality is based on forensic functions provided
by external tools but needs some additional
intervention to interpret the results and taking
further actions. Since the complexity of such a
task, some kind of intelligence is needed to take
decisions. This is represented by the evaluator,
which is an external component that can be
inserted into the analysis phase. The evaluator
functionality can be performed by a human
examiner as well as an external plugin which
implements advanced AI techniques[10], such
as Machine Learning[11], Expert Systems [12],
Human Expertise, and so on.
4.1 Architecture
The HyBIS architecture is shown in Figure 2.
As can be seen, on the guest side, there is
a Windows OS running on a virtual machine
(VM). On the host side, there is the hypervi-
sor that controls the VM, which incorporates
the HyBIS component. The HyBIS component
Figure 2. HyBIS Architecture
extends the hypervisor with the new secu-
rity functionalities. Such functionalities are
implemented by three components, described
below. Outside the hypervisor, on the same
side, there is the memory forensic tool, which
is used by HyBIS to provide advanced analysis
capabilities.
HyBIS Components: HyBIS includes three
components:
• Smart Memory Dumper (SMD): this compo-
nent allows creating the dynamic dumps
described in the previous section; it lever-
ages the hypervisor to read the VM’s RAM
contents and create or update dump files
on the host disk.
• Hidden Process Finder (HPF): this compo-
nent allows detecting hidden processes
running in the guest Windows OS; it
leverages the external memory forensic
tool to perform analyses on the dump files
created by SMD.
• Rootkit Process Blocker (RPB): this compo-
nent allows blocking a detected rootkit
process on the guest OS, by preventing
it from being scheduled for execution; it
receives from HPF the information on
the detected process and leverages the
hypervisor for manipulating the VM’s
RAM.
All these components operate while the guest
OS is running, without interrupting/suspend-
ing its execution.
64.2 Technology Details
In this section we discuss the technologies
selected for the development of the first HyBIS
prototype. In particular, the target Windows
version, the hypervisor and the forensic tool
have been chosen due to their effectiveness
and wide deployment base.
The Target OS: most of the latest security-
related work still focuses on Windows XP or
Windows 7 OSes. However, Windows 8 intro-
duced some internal changes (such as [13]) and
security mechanisms (see [14]) which partially
invalidate previous results. For instance, the
removal of the KiFastSystemCall function
makes all rootkit techniques based on this
function unusable[15]. Furthermore, the latest
Windows 10 OS appears to keep such changes,
rendering previous work yet more obsolete.
At the time we started the development
of HyBIS, Windows 10 was only available
in its Technical Preview release. Hence, we
selected Windows 8.1 (which is much more
widespread then Windows 8) as the target of
our experiments.
We initially decided to focus our tests on
the 32-bit version since it is more efficient
when performing extensive memory-related
experiments. Furthermore, the 64-bit version
which implements more advanced security
mechanisms, would have limited our malware
testbed. As such, it will be the target of future
work.
The Hypervisor: most of the recent projects
targeting Windows as guest OS, involve the
qemu-kvm [16] or the Xen hypervisors [17]
(e.g. [18], [19]). Although these ones represent
valid tools, we decided to make use of the
VirtualBox[20] hypervisor. In fact, VirtualBox
has two main advantages over qemu-kvm
and Xen: firstly, it fully supports all Windows
versions, including the latest Windows 10; sec-
ondly, it includes various VM-debugging func-
tionalities, that allow controlling and manipu-
lating VM components[21]. Such funcionalities
can be very useful when implementating ad-
vanced introspection techniques.
For the HyBIS prototype implementation the
latest VirtualBox 5.0 version has been used.
The Memory Forensic Tool: among the
available FMA tools, Volatility[22] is certainly
the most widespread. It has a vast number of
functionalities and it can count on a very active
community. Nonetheless, it does not fully sup-
port all Windows kernel versions. In addition,
Figure 3. The HyBIS prototype leverages the
VirtualBox’s Execution Manager (EM), Page
Manager (PGM), and Debug Facility (DBGF)
components
its performance on memory analysis is quite
low for our real-time usage requirement.
A derived project, named Rekall[23], over-
comes these limits, while maintaining main
Volatility features and advantages. Its novel
kernel profiling system, enables Rekall to auto-
matically upgrade its compatibility with new
Windows versions[24]. Furthermore, thanks to
some improved memory-scanning functions,
it shows better analysis performances. This
renders Rekall both more efficient and effective
than Volatility. Moreover, it can be integrated as
part of other software as a library. Finally, since
Rekall is implemented in the Python language,
it can be easily installed into a variety of host
OSes.
5 IMPLEMENTATION DETAILS
We will now describe how the proposed archi-
tecture was implemented by making use of the
previosly-mentioned technologies.
The HyBIS implementation details are de-
picted in Figure 3. As before, on the guest
side we have a Windows OS, running in a
VM. On the host side, we have the VirtualBox
hypervisor, with its internal components: the
Execution Manager (EM), the Page Manager
(PGM), and the Debug Facility (DBGF). The
HyBIS component is implemented as a new
VirtualBox component, interacting with the
other ones to perform its task. In particular,
the SMD component leverages PGM for the
7memory acquisition, and EM for the automatic
boot dump generation. The RPB component
uses DBGF to manipulate guest memory. The
HPF component makes use of the external
Rekall component to perform advanced mem-
ory analyses over memory dumps.
The interaction with the HyBIS components
is provided through a set of new commands
on the VirtualBox integrated Debug Console.
These commands will be described later in this
section.
5.1 Extending VirtualBox
The following VirtualBox components have
been involved for the HyBIS implementation:
• Virtual Machine Monitor (VMM): this is the
core hypervisor.
• Execution Manager (EM): it controls the
execution of guest code.
• Page Manager (PGM): it controls guest
memory paging.
• Debug Facility (DBGF): it provides a built-
in debugger for the VM.
Most of the VM-related components are
implemented in the VMM section. Therefore,
this is the most suitable place where to insert
the new HyBIS component.
The EM component is leveraged to monitor
the CPU operation mode in order to auto-
matically generate the boot dump. The PGM
provides all guest memory management func-
tions and is used to implement the acquisition
functionalities. The DBGF provides a lot of
useful debugging functions, which are used
for implementing the reaction functionality.
Furthermore, it provides the console devoted
to the interaction with the HyBIS component.
5.2 Integrating Rekall
Since Rekall is written in Python, an interpreter
must be present on the host system.
For incorporating Rekall, it has been neces-
sary to import the Python C++ library into
the VirtualBox source code. The Rekall func-
tionalities, instead, can be used by means of
the provided API library, as mentioned in the
previous section. In order to make use of the
forensic analysis functions, a suitable session
has to be set up. A Rekall session represents
a specific combination of a dump file and a
selected profile.
When starting a session, if a valid profile for
the current kernel version is found, every com-
patible Rekall plugin automatically becomes
available to be used for a forensic analysis.
5.3 Using HyBIS
In order to enable the HyBIS funcionalities,
the VirtualBox sources must be patched and
recompiled. To this purpose, a generic HyBIS
patch has been created, which is easily applica-
ble the almost every recent VirtualBox version.
Furthermore, it is necessary to run VirtualBox
with the debug option (--dbg) to enable the
interactive console.
As previously mentioned, HyBIS implements
its own debugger commands to allow using
the new functionalities. The main commands
are:
• .dumpmem: generates a raw dump file;
• .dumprangediff: updates a specific
memory area in a previous dump, saving
overwritten data in separate files;
• .setbootdump: sets an automatic mem-
ory dump at startup (needs reboot);
• .pslist: scans guest memory for pro-
cesses and prints a compared view table
;
• .psblock: receives the address of a
process object and removes it from the
scheduling list;
• .startsess and .stopsess: start/stop
a new analysis session;
Two kinds of interaction are supported: (1)
the standalone mode and (2) the session mode.
The session mode creates a dump file and
allows following actions to be taken on it. This
allows performing multiple analyses over the
same dump. In the standalone mode, every sub-
mitted command creates a temporary dump on
which the command will be applied. This mode
leaves the currently open session untouched,
enabling the comparison of the results of a test
with a previous checkpoint.
6 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
A large number of experiments have been per-
formed for testing the implemented prototype.
Both effectiveness and functionality of each
HyBIS component described in Section 3 has
been tested. In this section we show the testbed
used for the experiments and the preliminary
results obtained.
8Testbed: All experiments were conducted
on a VM with 1 GB of memory and a sin-
gle processor with Intel VT-x, EPT, and PAE
enabled. As stated above, the target OS was
Windows 8.1 32-bit. The OS was infected with
different rootkit specimens, chosen among the
most widespread and dangerous, like ZeuS[25],
or ZeroAccess[26].
Boot Dump Generation: In order to prove
the effectiveness of this function, the generated
dumps has been analyzed with Rekall. In
particular, after scanning the dump for active
processes, the only System process has been
found. This proves that the dump generation
occurs at the beginning of the Windows kernel
execution.
In addition, for testing purposes, some
dumps have been automatically generated just
before the ”correct” time. Both Rekall and
Volatility, failed to analyze such dumps in any
way. This is due to the fact that such tools
rely on specific memory objects created by the
kernel.
As such, we can state this function generates
a dump at the very first suitable moment for
being analyzed by these FMA tools. Moreover,
we believe this functionality can be helpful in
detecting rootkits which load very early during
the Windows boot phase.
Dynamic Dumping: This function has been
tested by updating a restricted area of a dump.
In particular, we identified a range of addresses,
which we showed to always contain all process
objects. Such a range has size 250 MB, that is
a quarter of the original 1 GB size.
With the purpose of proving the usefulness
of this functionality, we started a new process
in the guest, before the updating the dump.
Then we scanned the updated dump for active
processes by using Rekall. As expected, the
resulting process list also contained the new
process.
This demontrates that such a dynamic mem-
ory acquisition does not prevent Rekall to
properly work with respect to specific oper-
ations. This enables a new form of memory
monitoring, which is not limited to single page
changes, but involves larger areas. In fact, by
leveraging FMA, it is possible to check such
areas for more “high-level” changes, such as
the presence a new process.
Detection and Blocking of Hidden Pro-
cesses: By comparing the process list returned
by the new .pslist command of the Vir-
tualBox debugger, to that of the guest Task
Manager, we have been able to detect various
hidden processes created by rootkits.
The Rekall plugin used to implement the
command probes memory using various meth-
ods, including a full scan for process objects.
Since the Windows kernel does not immedi-
ately delete objects after a process terminates, it
is possible to have a lot of false positives in the
results. Fortunately, these are easily recognized
in that they only results from the full scan,
while being absent from all system lists.
After identifying the hidden process, it was
possible to block it by means of the .psblock
command. This removes the hidden process ob-
ject from the system scheduling list (and other
system lists), thus preventing its execution. In
order to prove the effectiveness of this action,
we analyzed again the active processes and
verified the malicious process was not in the
active process lists anymore.
Considerations on Windows 8.1: During the
experiments, we tried to install a huge number
of rootkit specimens on the guest Windows OS,
but only a few of them successfully infected
the system. Many of them fail to run, while
others achieve to run, but even when executed
with privileges, they fail to tamper with the
target resources. In particular they often failed
to create hidden persisten processes.
Conversely, when testing the same speci-
mens against Windows 7, they mostly succeed
in corrupting the OS. This fact may be due to
more effective protection of critical resources
by the Windows 8.1 kernel, or it can be caused
by a lack of rootkits targeting such a kernel
version.
7 DISCUSSION
HyBIS embodies several novel features, for
both its architecture and its implementation.
7.1 Architecture
Technically speaking, HyBIS is an hypervisor-
based IDS which leverages Virtual Machine
Introspection (VMI) to monitor a virtualized
environment and exploits Forensic Memory
Analysis (FMA) to bridge the semantic gap.
With respect to previous solutions, HyBIS
uses a novel approach, whose differences are
explained in the following.
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Use of VMI: typical hypervisor based IDSs
reside on the top of the hypervisor, in a Secure
Virtual Machine (SVM) (see Figure 4).
Such an approach has the advantage of
isolating the security functions so to avoid
corruption. However, in such a case, the IDS
requires an additional VM, and its capabilities
are limited by the functionalities provided
through the hypervisor APIs. HyBIS, instead,
is integrated into the hypervisor, as shown in
Figure 2. As such, it is able to exploit all the
hypervisor capabilities in order to have a full
control over the target VM.
An alternative VMI approach leverages ad-
vanced CPU features to interpose the se-
curity functions between the OS and the
hardware[28], [29]. However, this kind of hy-
pervisor does not have the control over all
the machine components. Furthermore, this
approach usually requires an in-guest agent
to be installed into the OS kernel. Conversely,
HyBIS does not require any addition to the
guest OS kernel and does not rely on any CPU
feature.
So, while current VMI-based solutions have
limited possibilities to exploit the hypervisor
capabilities, the HyBIS novel approach gives
the ability to fully exploit them by integrating
into the hypervisor. By working from below
the VM, it has a full overview of the whole
machine state, while is still isolated from the
target machine, thus avoiding both OS-level
and hardware-level attacks.
Use of Memory Forensics: FMA can be
a valuable means for VMI-based systems to
bridge the semantic gap. However, it has not
yet been fully leveraged by current solutions.
This is probably due to the slowness of the
memory acquisition process. In fact, FMA tools
usually operate on offline dump files, whose
creation may take too long for a practical real-
time usage. As such, memory acquisition, rep-
resents a critical step for the implementation of
a real-time FMA-based solution. Furthermore,
the soundness of the acquisition process is
another serious concern[30].
Typically, memory is dumped by tools in-
stalled into the guest OS (see [31]). Such tools
have the drawback of altering memory con-
tents and to be vulnerable to OS-level attacks
which may corrupt acquired data. Alternatively,
memory acquisition can be hardware-based,
using techniques, such as DMA, that allow by-
passing the OS. Such techniques, however, can
still be bypassed by hardware-level rootkits,
such as in [32] [33] and [34], which are able to
alter acquired data for hiding their presence.
By leveraging the hypervisor, HyBIS is able
to acquire memory, without being vulnerable
OS-level and hardware-level attacks. Also, its
novel dynamic approach allows an efficient
dump creation, thus enabling a live usage of
the FMA tools.
7.2 Implementation
The chosen technologies for the HyBIS imple-
mentation was not only chosen for their useful
features. All of them represent an element of
novelty for security research.
First of all, the chosen Windows kernel
version has been poorly explored in previous
work. Most recent Windows-related papers
still refer to Windows 7 as the subject of their
studies, or as the target for their experiments.
Actually we was not able to find any kernel-
related research on Windows 8 and Windows
8.1. Instead, in our HyBIS implementation
and testing Windows 8.1 was used. The latest
Windows 10 has also been successfully tested
against our prototype.
Leveraging the Virtualbox hypervisor rep-
resents another relevant contribution of this
paper. Most security and virtualization stud-
ies involved other common hypervisors, like
KVM or Xen. Instead, besides a few perfor-
mance analysis, we was able to find only
a single work involving VirtualBox for its
implementation[35]. In the development of
HyBIS, VirtualBox resulted as a great tool to be
employed for our project. In fact, its features
and functionalities have been very helpful for
the exploration of VMI techniques.
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A similar discussion can be made for the
Rekall forensic tool. To the best of our knowl-
edge, Rekall was rarely used as part of a secu-
rity research project. The only online reference
found, was in [36], where Rekall was used to
analyze Windows profiling. This is probably
due to its relatively recent introduction (2007).
Most studies and researches involved Volatility
instead, from which Rekall was derived. In
fact, Volatility has the advantage of being
more widespread and supported. However, as
previously described, Rekall presents almost
the same features but introduce novel features
that drastically improves performance and
usability. As such, we found it a valuable tool
for memory forensic research.
8 RELATED WORK
In this section we survey most relevant related
work and stress main differences with respect
to our solution.
Zhang et al.[37] leverage SMM, an advanced
x86 execution mode, for detecting memory-
based stealthy malware. Their SPECTRE frame-
work can introspect a live operating system and
supports both Windows and Linux OSes. How-
ever, this framework is vulnerable to hardware-
based attacks, such as [34]. Furthermore, their
work is limited to Windows XP SP3.
In [38], Hizver and Chiueh make use of
Volatility for the analysis of VM execution
states. Their RTKDMS system is able to per-
form real-time monitoring at the hypervisor
level. Differently from HyBIS, such an archi-
tecture leverages an additional VM for the
introspection analysis. Again, the experiments
are limited to Windows XP. Furthermore, their
system does not tackle the rootkit threat specifi-
cally, neither it explores any reaction possibility.
Deng et al. [18] propose the SPIDER archic-
ture, a stealthy program instrumentation and
debugging framework built upon hardware vir-
tualization. SPIDER enables monitoring mem-
ory read/write at any address. Nonetheless,
unlike HyBIS, it requires an in-guest agent
which modifies the guest OS kernel.
In [19], Lengyel et al. describe DRAKVUF, a
novel dynamic malware analysis system based
on Xen, which improves hardware resources
usage efficiency. DRAKVUF takes advantage of
the hardware virtualization extensions to pro-
vide a transparent and scalable environment to
enable in-depth analysis of malware samples.
In this case, the target OS is Windows 7 SP1
in both 32- and 64-bit versions.
Zhang et al. [34] hacks CPU registers, ded-
icated to the MMIO mechanism, to conceal a
memory portion used to store malicious code.
In-guest software is unable to access the hidden
memory portions since all their operations pass
through the CPU. The proposed mechanism is
also able to evade physical memory forensic
though DMA. Since HyBIS operates at the
hypervisor level, it does not rely on the guest
machine and it is then able to access the whole
physical memory without restrictions. Hence,
HyBIS is not affected by this kind of rootkit.
Furthermore, at the hypervisor level it is pos-
sible to monitor the CPU in order to detect
possibly unsolicited register modification and
then to prevent this type of hacks.
Harrison[7] suggests an approach that is
somewhat similar to HyBIS. However it aims
to be integrated into other IDS solutions and
mostly focuses on the analysis phase. HyBIS,
instead also explores the novel reaction capa-
bilities given by the combination of VMI and
FMA techniques.
9 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this work we provide several contributions,
shedding light on some security issues of the
obscure Windows security computing field.
The main contribution is the design of the
novel HyBIS architecture, which successfully
combines VMI and FMA to build up an anti-
rootkit security system for Windows. VMI
is used to examine the Windows status by
means of hardware monitoring, while FMA is
used to carve meaningful information from the
raw memory data. Initial experimental activity
was performed over most relevant malware
specimens, allowing us to detect and block dif-
ferent hidden processes. Given the generality
of the architectural complexity of the Windows
kernel security field, the results reported in this
paper—other than being interesting on their
own—also pave the way for further research.
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